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I. INTRODUCTION
We may distinguish three styles or strategies of decisionmaking.
Under a maximizing approach, the decisionmaker chooses the action
whose consequences are best for the case at hand (defining “best”
according to some value the decisionmaker holds). Where decisionmakers
choose the action that is best relative to constraints, accounting for the
direct costs and opportunity costs of decisionmaking, we may call the
approach optimizing rather than maximizing. Whereas the maximizer
focuses only on the case at hand, the optimizer acts so as to maximize
value over an array of cases. In contrast to both approaches, satisficing
* Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Prepared
for the University of San Diego Law School conference “What is Legal Interpretation?”.
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permits any decision whose results in the case at hand are good
enough—although we will see that satisficing, like optimizing, may
itself represent an indirect strategy of maximization.
In what follows, I will suggest that these distinctions illuminate legal
interpretation. Interpretation is just another type of decisionmaking, so
interpreters must use some decision procedure or other. Many approaches
to the interpretation of statutes and the Constitution are maximizing
approaches that attempt to produce as much as possible of some value
the interpreter holds—for example, fidelity to legislative intent or
original understandings. Optimizing approaches to interpretation1 condemn
maximizing interpretation as a simpleminded approach that neglects the
costs of decisionmaking and the costs of interpretive error. An alternative
to both maximizing and optimizing approaches is a satisficing style of
interpretation, in which interpreters eschew the search for the very best
interpretation (even within constraints), instead selecting an interpretation
that is good enough, in light of whatever value theory the interpreter
holds. The choice among decisionmaking strategies is utterly agnostic
about the underlying value theory. Whatever such theory the interpreter
holds, there is always a separate question about which decision
procedures are best suited to promote the decisionmaker’s aims.
I will criticize the maximizing style of interpretation and praise its two
competitors. Both the optimizing and satisficing perspectives, I suggest,
help in different ways to justify some controversial approaches to
statutory and constitutional interpretation, such as the rule barring
resort to legislative history where statutes have a plain meaning, and
clause-bound (as opposed to broadly holistic or “intratextualist”)
interpretation of statutes and the Constitution. Although maximizing
interpretation is untenable, neither the optimizing approach nor the
satisficing approach is globally best; each is an attractive decision procedure
in some contexts. Where the interpretive stakes are either very low or
very high, satisficing is reasonable (whether or not rational in some
stronger sense), while optimizing is best suited to medium-stakes decisions.
I begin, in Section II, by clarifying the conceptual distinctions among
maximizing, optimizing, and satisficing. Section III identifies interpretive
styles that draw upon these decisionmaking strategies, criticizes some
1. Pioneered by Fred Schauer, among others. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The
Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND.
L. REV. 715 (1992). Expanding the lens to include the problems faced by interpreters on
a multimember court, Schauer also defends an account of plain meaning that has
satisficing overtones: interpreters might coordinate on plain meaning even though it is
merely acceptable to each, because it can secure the agreement of all. See Frederick
Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990
SUP. CT. REV. 231.
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prominent examples of maximizing interpretation, and examines some
contested interpretive principles that the optimizing and satisficing
perspectives might justify. Section IV offers some considerations that
bear upon the choice between optimizing and satisficing as interpretive
strategies. Section V considers the wide appeal of maximizing styles of
interpretation, and suggests some mechanisms that cause maximizing
interpretation to appear more attractive than it should.
II. MAXIMIZING, OPTIMIZING, AND SATISFICING
The standard model of rational decisionmaking defines rational choice
as choice that maximizes some value. In a common interpretation, the
value to be maximized is welfare, in turn defined (contentiously) as the
satisfaction of subjective preferences. Nothing inherent in the model,
however, requires this; the idea of rational choice deployed in decision
theory is strictly formal. The decisionmaker simply ranks the outcomes
of possible actions according to some scale of value and chooses the
maximizing action—the action that produces the highest value. The
model can be extended to cover situations of risk, in which the outcomes
of actions are probabilistic rather than certain, by taking the maximand
to be expected as opposed to actual value. In situations of uncertainty,
where not even the probabilities of various outcomes are known, the
standard view suggests that decisionmakers can simply assign subjective
probabilities, converting uncertainty back into risk. Other views propose
other choice criteria, such as maximin (maximizing the minimum payoff).
The distinctions among certainty, risk, and uncertainty are orthogonal to
the issue I address here; the important point is that in all of these
situations, the standard model defines rational choice as maximizing
choice.
In the simplest versions of the standard model, the feasible set of actions
or options is just given. Here the idea of satisficing is incoherent. How
could it be rational, in a static context, to choose anything other than the
best available action—to do anything other than maximizing? Some
philosophers suggest that it can be rational to choose less than the best,
so long as the action chosen is satisfactory.2 But if the action chosen is
less than the best and also satisfactory, than the best action is also
satisfactory, and satisficing gives no reason to choose the former over

2.

MICHAEL SLOTE, BEYOND OPTIMIZING: A STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (1989).
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the latter.3 In static contexts, the superiority of maximizing to satisficing
is conceptually entailed by the scale of value the decisionmaker uses.
Satisficing comes into its own, however, when decisionmaking is viewed
more dynamically.4 In many real world decisions, the set of options is
itself (at least partially) the product of earlier decisions. One of the most
important questions decisionmakers face is the extent of rational search:
how many options, and how much information, should be sought out and
considered before an ultimate choice is made? Here satisficing is
coherent; as Herbert Simon emphasizes, satisficing is a constraint on
further search for new information and new options.5 The satisficer
searches only until finding a choice whose outcomes are good enough.
By satisficing with respect to the particular decision at hand, the
satisficer conserves time and other resources that may then be expended
on other decisions.
In dynamic settings, optimizing is also best understood as a constraint
on further search for new options or new information. Maximizing
always takes place within budget constraints, especially time. To maximize
in the simpleminded sense of searching until one finds the very best
option in the case at hand, all things considered, is to neglect the
opportunity costs of search. (Although simpleminded maximizing in the
case at hand is indefensible, I will also claim below that it is a common
approach to interpretive decisionmaking). The antonym of satisficing, on
this view, is not simpleminded maximizing. Rather it is optimizing, by
which we denote maximization that takes into account constraints, such
as the cost of searching for further information and options. The optimizer
searches until the costs of further search equal or exceed the expected
benefits of additional information, or of new options.
In what follows, then, I shall contrast three different decisionmaking
strategies: maximizing, taken to mean a simpleminded effort to find the
very best choice, all things considered, in the particular decisionmaking
context at hand;6 optimizing, or maximization that takes into account the
direct costs and opportunity costs of acquiring information and making
decisions; and satisficing. Optimizing and satisficing are different ways
of pursuing the same larger aim. Both strategies rest on an implicit
recognition that to do what is best, all things considered, with respect to
3.

See David Schmidtz, Satisficing as a Humanly Rational Strategy, in SATISFICING
30, 39 (Michael Byron ed.,

AND MAXIMIZING: MORAL THEORISTS ON PRACTICAL REASON

2004).
4. See generally Michael Byron, Satisficing and Optimality, 109 ETHICS 67 (1998).
5. See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. OF
ECON. 99 (1955); HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 85 (1983).
6. An accessible critique of maximizing can be found in BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE
PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004), although Schwartz does not clearly
distinguish optimizing from satisficing.
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some particular decision in an array of decisions is to do something that
may not be globally best, or best from some larger perspective. Both
strategies, in other words, are second-order maximizing:7 to maximize
globally, the decisionmaker may do best to choose in a way that is less
than maximally best with respect to the local decision at hand.
It is important to be clear, however, that optimizing and satisficing are
different second-order decision strategies. The two strategies employ
different stopping rules, or rules for constraining further search among
possible options.8 The optimizer stops searching when the marginal benefit
of finding a better option, discounted by the probability of finding such
an option, is equal to or less than the costs of further search. The
satisficer stops searching when she finds an option that is good enough.
Although the two strategies sometimes yield similar choices, sometimes
they do not,9 and even if they were extensionally equivalent, the two
strategies would still represent intrinsically different rules.
As the reference to stopping rules suggests, the jurisprudential
distinction between rules and standards is relevant. Maximizing is the
ultimate standard: the maximizer does what is best, all things considered,
taking into account the totality of the circumstances relevant to the local
decision at hand. Optimizing and satisficing strategies both appeal to the
higher-order virtues of rules—to the idea that a decisionmaker who takes
into account less than the full set of considerations that bear on a
particular decision may, for a range of reasons, do better over a whole
array of decisions, than does the simpleminded maximizer.10 Yet this
conceptual point about the possible virtues of rules does not purport to
specify the content of the rules. Optimizing and satisficing strategies are
different stopping rules that use different means to their common aim of
global maximization. “An optimizing strategy places limits on how
much we are willing to invest in seeking alternatives. A satisficing
strategy places limits on how much we insist on finding before we quit
that search and turn our attention to other matters.”11

7. Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, 110
ETHICS 5 (1999).
8. See Schmidtz, supra note 3, at 31.
9. See Jonathan Bendor & Sunil Kumar, Satisficing: A Pretty Good Heuristic, at
http://www.stanford.edu/~dasiegel/BKS_satisficing—2004.pdf (last visited April 28, 2005).
10. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 145–55 (1991).
11. Schmidtz, supra note 3, at 35.
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Here is an illustration of the three strategies.12 Three decision
theorists—M, O, and S—enter the main university cafeteria, which holds
no less than twenty separate stations, each of which offers a different
type of cuisine. M is a simpleminded maximizer who seeks the most
satisfying possible meal right now. M spends the next hour visiting each
station, pondering possible choices, and so on. (By the time M is done
choosing his meal, O and S have finished eating and are back in their
offices working on papers). O is a second-order maximizer, who sees that
maximizing her satisfaction from this particular meal is suboptimal from
an overall perspective. O thus adopts a stopping rule that is calculated to
optimize her satisfaction, taking into account decision costs and opportunity
costs. Calculating the marginal costs and benefits, O decides to visit five
randomly selected stations out of the possible twenty, and then to choose
from within this set the station whose offering maximizes the satisfaction of
O’s tastes. S is also a second-order maximizer, but she employs a
different stopping rule: S proceeds along the stations until he finds an
offering that is good enough, and then stops searching. Although O and
S may happen to light upon the same offering, there is no guarantee
that they will do so, and although it is true that both O and S
manage to avoid the plight of the obsessive and self-defeating M,
they have used different strategies to that end.
Of course no maximizer really considers all things. M will eventually
choose a meal, rather then spend an infinite amount of time evaluating
micro-features of the alternatives. Yet M may spend far more time and
effort on this local choice than would be justified from a second-order,
globally maximizing perspective. Although the local maximizer will
stop at some point, that point may lie far beyond the local optimum, as
identified from the global point of view.13
III. DECISIONMAKING AND INTERPRETATION
What does all this have to do with interpretation? Many debates over
interpretive practices are debates over the decision procedures
interpreters should use. These debates include important questions about
how much information interpreters should collect, what set of possible
interpretations to consider, and what stopping rules they should use as
constraints on further search for information. Examining the history and
theory of statutory and constitutional interpretation in America, we can
identify interpretive styles that correspond to, and implicitly draw upon,
12. Adapted from Schmidtz, id., who uses as an illustration the process of buying a
house.
13. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, for many examples of pathological
maximizing in daily life.
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the decisionmaking strategies we have identified.
Rather than pursue this theme in the abstract, I will proceed by
demonstration, examining just two of the many settings in which the
contrast among these interpretive strategies shows plainly. The first
involves the debate over legislative history and the plain meaning rule.
The second involves the debate, in both statutory and constitutional
arenas, over the weight to be accorded to statutory or constitutional
clauses collateral to the clauses directly at issue—including the question
of how much attention judges should pay to statutes in pari materia.
A. Legislative History and the Plain Meaning Rule
Suppose interpreters are intentionalists: they subscribe to some
high-level political theory, perhaps an account of representative democracy,
according to which legislators’ intentions make the law. Intentionalism
thus supplies the value theory that defines what counts as a good or bad
interpretation: a good interpretation is one that captures legislators’
intentions. Suppose also that this scale of value is continuous: interpretations
may capture more or less of the legislators’ true intentions, and the more
the better.
Maximizing. In light of this value theory, the intentionalist interpreter
who is also a simpleminded maximizer will proceed to search as widely
as possible for information about legislators’ intentions in the case at
hand. On this view, interpreters may begin by consulting statutory text
for evidence of legislative intent. But there is nothing special about the
text. Interpreters will range beyond the statute to consult legislative history,
previous and subsequent statutes, perhaps even in-court testimony from
the statute’s drafters.14 This expansive search for further information
about legislators’ intentions follows from the assumption that “[t]here is
no invariable rule for the discovery of [legislative] intention.”15 Any
source is in principle admissible, and should be given whatever
probative weight it intrinsically deserves.16
Despite its intuitive appeal, simpleminded maximizing intentionalism of
this sort is exposed to serious objections. It neglects the direct costs and
14. See Campbell v. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 125 Cal. Rptr. 694, 696 n.3 (1975)
overruled by Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. San Diego Cmty. Dist. 621 P.2d 856 (1981)
(allowing testimony by the statute’s drafter because “[i]t constitutes some indication at
least of the probable intent of the Legislature”).
15. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940).
16. Id. at 542–44.
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opportunity costs of searching further and further afield for evidence of
legislative intentions. We may sort these costs into two rough categories,
decision costs and error costs. Holding constant the accuracy of decisions,
simpleminded maximizing intentionalism produces wasted effort (from
an ex post standpoint) whenever the interpretation the court ultimately
settles upon, after extensive review of collateral sources, is the same
interpretation it would have reached with a more restricted set of
sources. Holding the costs of decision constant, searching further and
further afield might even reduce accuracy even in the decision at hand, if
maximizers with constrained cognitive and information-processing
capacities become bewildered by a large set of conflicting evidence.
Furthermore, decision costs and accuracy interact over the whole array of
cases. Even if collecting more and more evidence of legislative intentions
in Case 1 increases accuracy in that case, the opportunity cost of search
means that the intentionalist interpreter will have less time to spend on
Case 2 than she would if decisionmaking resources were distributed
more evenly over cases—which means that the interpreter will tend to
perform less accurately in Case 2.
Optimizing. An important alternative to simpleminded maximizing
intentionalism, therefore, is optimizing intentionalism, which constrains
the search for evidence of legislators’ intentions by reference to a larger
cost-benefit calculus. The optimizing intentionalist employs a stopping
rule: she declines to search further afield if the expected benefits of
further search are less than the costs. Included among the costs are both
the decision costs of search and the costs of error—the chance that
adding new sources will reduce accuracy by driving a fallible interpreter
off a correct interpretation that a smaller set of sources would have
suggested. There is also a chance that adding new sources will increase
accuracy, but this is accounted for on the benefits side of the ledger.
This description of the optimizing intentionalist calculus is abstract.
We have sketched the variables the optimizing intentionalist must consider,
but the specific decision-rules that result will depend on what the values
of those variables actually are. The point here is just that, given certain values
of the relevant variables, the notion of an optimizing-intentionalist stopping
rule provides a justification for considering less than all probative
information bearing on legislative intentions in particular cases—even for
interpreters fully committed to intentionalism as a high-level account of
statutes’ authority.
For an example, consider the version of intentionalism embodied in
the “plain meaning rule.” Under that rule, legislative intent is the ultimate
object of interpretation, but clear statutory text is conclusive evidence of
legislative intent. The plain meaning rule is a stopping rule: the interpreter
stops searching for further evidence of legislative intentions when the
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statutory text is clear. Further search, into legislative history for
example, is permissible only when the statutory text is ambiguous or
otherwise lacks a plain meaning.
Thus in Caminetti v. United States,17 the Court affirmed a conviction
under the White Slave Traffic Act of a man who had transported a
woman across state lines to become his mistress. The Court reasoned
that the statute’s prohibition of interstate transportation for any “immoral
purpose” was so plain as to obviate the need for any recourse to
legislative history18—even though that history, according to the dissenters,
showed that the intent of the prohibition was to criminalize only
prostitution or other commercialized immorality.19 Although the Court
conceded that legislative history “may aid the courts in reaching the true
meaning of the legislature in cases of doubtful interpretation,” it held
that “the language being plain . . . it is the sole evidence of the ultimate
legislative intent.”20
Nothing in the optimizing-intentionalist view of Caminetti, and the
plain meaning rule, excludes or needs to exclude the possibility that the
dissenters in Caminetti were correct. Perhaps the plain meaning did not
actually track legislators’ intentions, and the legislative history would
have revealed them. From the second-order standpoint of the optimizing
decisionmaker, this is just to repeat the point that the plain meaning rule
tolerates results that are suboptimal or erroneous in the decision at hand,
all things considered, for the sake of better results over an array of
interpretive decisions.
Under certain circumstances, this tradeoff is beneficial overall. Suppose
that plain statutory text is usually excellent evidence of legislative intent,
and that going beyond statutory text into voluminous and complex
legislative history often produces high decision costs and opportunity
costs. Given finite time and decisionmaking capacity, and an array of
future cases that must be decided, the interpreter may do better overall
by allocating less effort to discerning legislative intentions in the
particular case, while allocating more effort to other cases in the array.
Moreover, simpleminded maximizing past the optimum point may
produce little improvement in accuracy even in the very case at hand. It
is quite possible that simpleminded intentionalist maximizing in a given
17.
18.
19.
20.

242 U.S. 470 (1917).
Id. at 486.
See id. at 496–503 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
Id. at 490.
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case will reduce accuracy, even in that very case, if cognitively fallible
interpreters are confused or led astray by legislative history, and thus
reject a correct interpretation that plain statutory text would otherwise
indicate.
For any of these reasons, simpleminded maximizing intentionalism
will do worse, from a higher-order perspective, than optimizing
intentionalism that employs a stopping rule. Again, I do not argue here
that the plain meaning rule is indeed the best stopping rule for
intentionalists. To decide that question, we would have to know more
than we currently do. I only mean to indicate a type of justification for
the plain meaning rule that is invisible to the maximizing interpreter.
Satisficing. A different stopping rule for intentionalist interpreters
would be to search until, but only until, a satisfactory interpretation is
found. The optimizing intentionalist, in a case like Caminetti, proceeds
on the basis of a rule that is calculated to produce the best possible
interpretation given the resource constraints, including limited time
and limited cognitive capacity, under which the interpreter labors. The
satisficing intentionalist employs a different approach. Rather than
searching for the best possible interpretation, even under constraints, the
satisficer sets a limit to search by accepting the first interpretation that is
good enough.
A satisficing interpreter might come to the same result as did the
Caminetti court, not on the ground that the costs of further search for
evidence of legislative intentions would be greater than the expected
benefits, but simply on the ground that the plain meaning of the text
provided an account of legislators’ intentions that was internally
consistent, intuitively plausible, and in that sense good enough. The idea
animating this relaxed attitude is that a maximizing search for the very
best account of legislators’ intentions would be a sort of local
perfectionism, and local perfectionism would make the interpretive
system worse off, from a higher-order point of view. As with optimizing,
satisficing intentionalism may produce a better allocation of time and
effort across a whole array of cases than does simpleminded maximizing
in each particular case. As compared to the optimizer, the satisficer uses
a different decision rule to produce the globally-maximizing allocation,
but the aim of global maximization is the same.
An interesting implication of the satisficing account is that the
interpretation the court produces is sensitive to the order in which
materials are considered. In our cafeteria example, which offering the
satisficing consumer ends up choosing depends upon which end of the
cafeteria she starts from (assuming there are satisfactory offerings at
various points in the line). In Caminetti, a court that (1) employed a
satisficing stopping rule, but (2) considered legislative history before
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statutory text, would conclude that the legislative history offered a fully
satisfactory account of legislators’ intentions. The bare idea of satisficing,
by itself, cannot justify a rule that intentionalist interpreters should stop
with the plain (and satisfactory) meaning of the text, as opposed to the
plain (and satisfactory) meaning of the legislative history. But this is not
a serious objection to the satisficer. In any decisionmaking setting in which
less than all possible alternatives are to be searched out and considered,
one must begin somewhere. The satisficing interpreter will satisfice at
this higher level as well, accepting any starting point that is good
enough.
The starting point will thus be set by convention, within any particular
legal system. In our legal system, the convention is that statutory text is
the starting point, and intentionalist stopping rules constrain the search
for evidence beyond the text. The convention might be otherwise, as far
as the satisficing perspective goes, but in fact it is not otherwise. The
satisficing judge in our legal system has no reason to lose sleep over
what satisficing interpreters might do in other, possibly counterfactual
legal systems.
The allure of maximizing intentionalism. A simple idea, which seems
intuitive to many, is that the intentionalist interpreter should consider all
relevant and probative evidence of legislative intentions in the case at
hand. To deny this is to lose the rhetorical high ground (a point to which
I return in Section V): the maximizing intentionalist can always lampoon
the optimizing or satisficing intentionalist by pointing to some particular
case in which an optimizing or satisficing stopping rule would cause the
interpreters to miss out on highly probative evidence of intentions. On
either the optimizing or satisficing perspectives, however, this sort of
argument is a simpleminded mistake, if it counsels neglecting the costs
of decisionmaking and the risks of error (the optimizer’s worry) or
neglecting the perils of local perfectionism (the satisficer’s worry).
If simpleminded maximizing intentionalism is mistaken, it is also a
prominent and often dominant strand in American legal interpretation.
Consider the famous Holy Trinity case, 21 in which the Court without
much ado discarded the traditional rule against consulting internal
committee reports as evidence of legislative intentions.22 The Court said
21. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
22. To be sure, the rule had been quietly breached in a few earlier opinions. See
Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold
Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1883, 1835–36 & nn.11–15 (1998).
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very little to justify this crucial methodological move, but it must have
seemed the most natural thing in the world. After all, a famous
intentionalist injunction held that “[w]here the mind labours to discover
the design of the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be
derived . . . .”23 The pre-Holy Trinity Court had combined this rule with
a rule barring judicial consideration of internal legislative evidence.24
To the Holy Trinity Court, this must have seemed an odd, even
incoherent combination, akin to telling a jury to “consider all relevant
evidence” while excluding the smoking gun the police seized from the
defendant.
In both the exclusionary rule setting and the interpretive setting,
however, it is familiar that there may be good higher-order reasons to
adopt seemingly conflicted rule combinations of this sort. What I add
here is a taxonomy of, and contrast between, two different interpretive
decision strategies grounded in higher-order considerations. Those
strategies have a common enemy or antonym, however. Both are
alternatives to the sort of simpleminded maximizing intentionalism that
has been so prominent in the history of American interpretive theory and
practice.
B. Clause-bound Textualism and Holistic Textualism
The previous example assumed an intentionalist account of interpretation.
Here I offer an example premised on a strictly textualist account of
interpretation, to show that textualist interpreters also face the choice
among maximizing, optimizing, and satisficing styles of interpretation.
The choice among decisionmaking strategies, I have suggested, is
entirely agnostic as among various value theories different interpreters
might hold. Textualists as well as intentionalists must pursue their aims
by means of some decision procedure or other, and thus face an
inescapable choice.
Suppose an interpreter believes that the aim of interpretation is to
capture the ordinary meaning of statutory or constitutional text, quite
apart from anyone’s intentions. (I bracket here, as irrelevant for our
purposes, the possible justifications for this view). The textualist interpreter
faces a range of implementation issues that must be confronted to make
her high-level commitment operational. How exactly should the
textualist view be embodied in decision procedures that interpreters will
use? Of these implementation questions, I consider only the following:
How much text should the interpreter consider? Suppose there is both
23.
24.
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(1) a primary text, a statutory section or constitutional clause whose
interpretation will determine the rule of law that applies between the
parties, and (2) a set of collateral texts, such as other provisions of the
Constitution, of the relevant statute, or of other statutes. How widely
should the textualist interpreter cast her net, and how much weight
should be given to collateral texts?
This issue underlies important debates in both statutory and
constitutional interpretation. In the statutory arena, the Court has at
times adopted a strong presumption of textual coherence across whole
statutes, on the view that textual similarities and differences across
provisions are at least presumptively significant.25 Justice Scalia’s
opinion for the Court in West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey 26
goes even further, suggesting that interpreters should treat the whole
U.S. Code as though terms are used consistently across statutes enacted
at different times.27 In constitutional interpretation, Akhil Amar defends
an “intratextualist” view that makes extensive use of comparisons across
clauses, even to the point of insisting that words appearing in widely
separated contexts be given similar meanings.28 Elsewhere in the
constitutional arena, there are occasional hints of an even more
expansive “intertextualist” view, analogous to the Casey opinion. On
this view, the Constitution would be read in light of collateral legal texts,
such as the Declaration of Independence and the Northwest Ordinance.29
What these views have in common is a commitment (more or less
expansive) to holistic or coherent textualism,30 as opposed to the sort of
25. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 568 (1995) (suggesting that
identical terms should presumptively be given identical meanings across a statute).
26. 499 U.S. 83 (1991) superceded by statute as stated in Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994).
27. Id. at 87–92, 99.
28. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 788–89 (1999).
29. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 255 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (arguing that the Declaration of Independence’s statement
pledging support for the Declaration through the signers’ “fortunes” is proof that pooling
money for expressive purposes is a form of free speech); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 554 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that the language of the
Northwest Ordinance supports a reading of the “free exercise” right that includes the
“accommodation of religious practice”).
30. The most ambitious version of holism or coherentism is Ronald Dworkin’s
idea of law as “integrity,” pursuant to which the whole corpus of law is to be read in a
coherent fashion. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). I have confined the
discussion here to holistic textualism, and Dworkin is not a textualist (at least in any
ordinary sense of that term). The critique of holistic maximizing, however, could also be
applied to Dworkin, with suitable modifications.
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clause-bound textualism that focuses principally or solely on the
statutory or constitutional provisions directly applicable in the case at
hand.
Maximizing. The textualist interpreter who is also a simpleminded
maximizer seeks the ordinary meaning of a legal term in the provision at
hand. Other provisions of the same text, or other legal texts, use the
same or different terms in ways that illuminate by contrast. The
simplemindedly maximizing textualist reasons that interpreters should
consult collateral texts as widely as possible, and give them whatever
weight they intrinsically deserve, all things considered, as evidence of
ordinary meaning. Indeed, on this construal there is nothing at all
special about legal texts; any sources of ordinary meaning will do, such
as dictionaries, literature, or the testimony of linguists. The reductio ad
nauseam of the search for ordinary meaning is not Casey. It is the
debate in Muscarello v. United States 31 over the meaning of the statutory
term “carry,” as in “carry a firearm.” The case occasioned heated
subsidiary debates over usage in the Bible, Melville, Defoe, and
M*A*S*H, and saw Justice Breyer (or his clerks) attempt to discern
ordinary meaning by collecting examples from a database of national
newspapers.
Optimizing and satisficing. Simpleminded maximizing textualism fails
on the same grounds that condemn simpleminded maximizing intentionalism.
The key points are familiar. First, holding constant the quality of decisions
(from a textualist perspective), the direct decision costs and opportunity
costs of holistic textualism are real, and perhaps quite high. The refined
and comprehensive comparisons required by maximizing textualism take
time. The time spent searching out and comparing usage across a whole
statutory code, or within a database, means less time spent on refined
textualism in other cases. Second, holding the costs of decisionmaking
constant, holistic textualism may do worse even according to the very
value theory presupposed by maximizing textualism itself. As compared
to clause-bound textualism, holistic or expansive textualism requires a
more complicated and information-intensive inquiry, one that will reduce
decisional accuracy whenever fallible interpreters read the comparison
texts mistakenly. There is no particular reason to think that the
illuminating effect of holistic texualism will predominate over its errorproducing effect. Third, and related to the last point, holistic textualism
in the hands of fallible interpreters risks producing a holistic, highly
coherent, but fundamentally mistaken analysis, one that enforces a
simultaneous misreading of a whole set of related provisions. Risk
averse interpreters might prefer the limited incoherence of clause-bound
31.
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interpretation to a sweeping, integrated, but erroneous universal account.
In light of these considerations, both optimizers and satisficers will
hold that textualists need a stopping rule that constrains the ever
expanding search for evidence of ordinary meaning. A consequence of
this is the standard tradeoff of local inferiority for global superiority.
Optimizing textualists and satisficing textualists will both be willing to
render interpretations in particular cases that are inferior, from a
textualist standpoint, to those that an infallible maximizing textualist
would render. The hope, for both optimizers and satisficers, is that local
inferiority will prove globally superior across a set of decisions—again,
superior on the same value theory that the locally-maximizing textualist
holds.
However, optimizers and satisficers will employ different stopping
rules to promote their common aim of superior performance from a
global perspective. The optimizing textualist attempts to calculate the
point at which the expected marginal benefit of further evidence of
textual meaning is equal to or less than the expected marginal cost, and
stops there. The satisficing textualist stops when the text(s) she has
examined point to an ordinary meaning that seems satisfactory—one that
is plausible to her, in light of her native linguistic competence, that
suggests a rational legislative policy, and so forth. Perhaps extensive
testimony by linguists, or a properly designed database search, would
make the meaning on which the satisficing interpreter has alighted seem
less satisfactory than it currently does. But the satisficer refuses to lose
sleep over that possibility, not because she anticipates that the costs of
further search equal or exceed the expected benefits, but because she
believes that the perfectionist search for the very best local interpretation
is often a self-defeating enterprise, from a global perspective. She
believes that yielding to the siren song of local perfectionism will make
her performance worse, overall, than does her resolute (even phlegmatic)
disposition to take the good in preference to searching for the best.
As usual, the two stopping rules might happen to converge to similar
results. An opinion that both optimizing textualists and satisficing
textualists might love is Dewsnup v. Timm.32 In Dewsnup, the Court
interpreted the phrase “allowed secured claim” in §506(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code and ignored holistic arguments that the phrase “allowed
secured claim” in §506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code might have something to
32.

502 U.S. 410 (1992).
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do with the matter.33 Instead, the Court adopted what Justices Scalia and
Souter, in dissent, derided as a “one-subsection-at-a-time approach to
statutory exegesis.”34 To the intentionalist or textualist maximizer,
opinions like Dewsnup seem foolishly narrow. Why not consider an
obviously relevant collateral provision when interpreting the provision at
hand? To the optimizer or the satisficer, however, stopping with
§506(d) might be a good idea, either because fathoming the complexities
of §506(a) is itself a daunting task for generalist interpreters (so daunting
that the costs of a wider inquiry outrun the expected benefits), or
because the Court’s straightforward interpretation of §506(d) was itself a
satisfactory local solution.
Before we leave these examples, a general caution is in order. It has
not been my enterprise here to defend, on the merits, any particular
interpretive decision procedures. Whether the optimizer or satisficer should
actually defend an opinion like Dewsnup will depend on the precise
shape of the cost-benefit curves (to the optimizer) or the level of judicial
aspiration (to the satisficer).35 I merely aim to illustrate two justifications
for using truncated interpretive decision procedures—justifications that
must forever remain invisible to the maximizing interpreter. Nor do I
mean to express any view about which interpretive strategy would be
best for judges in particular to use. A general issue is that suitable
interpretive decision procedures will vary with the institutional capacities
of different interpreters occupying different roles, and with regard to the
systemic interactions of different institutions.36 I confine myself here to
mapping the conceptual terrain. Choosing interpretive decision procedures
for particular interpreters turns on empirical questions, about institutional
capacities and systemic effects, which I do not address.
IV. OPTIMIZING OR SATISFICING?
If simpleminded local maximizing is an untenable interpretive posture,
which stopping rule should interpreters use? Proponents of optimizing,
on the one hand, and satisficing, on the other, have each offered generic
arguments that seek to knock out the rival stopping rule, leaving their
preferred rule in sole possession of the field, as the only valid alternative
to simpleminded maximizing. Here I offer some brief remarks on these
33. Id. at 417 & n.3 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), (d) (2000)).
34. Id. at 423 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35. For a sophisticated critique of Dewsnup, see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Boyd’s Legacy and Blackstone’s Ghost, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 393, 421–25.
36. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74
(2000); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 885 (2003).
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generic arguments, only to suggest that they fail. There is no knockout
argument against either optimizing or satisficing as decisionmaking
strategies in the service of global goals. The right assessment is more
catholic: both strategies have virtues and vices that vary across contexts,
and the two strategies can often be usefully combined. In general, and
thus in the interpretive setting as well, optimizers and satisficers can join
forces to reject simpleminded maximizing interpretation without having
to stage a second-round runoff to choose a single winner. The choice
between optimizing and satisficing will turn on particular features of the
decisionmaking context, especially the nature and size of the stakes.
Proponents of satisficing tax optimizers with a problem of infinite
regress. Optimizers stop searching for better alternatives, including better
interpretations, when the costs of further search exceed the expected
gain in new information (about legislative intentions, ordinary meaning,
and so on). Yet information is a good with unusual properties. One
cannot know what the value of new information will be until one has it.
“To maximize subject to the constraint of information cost one would
have to know the expected value of information, but this is not in general
possible.”37 On this view, satisficing is the only alternative to simpleminded
maximizing, because optimizing under conditions of limited information
is a contradiction in terms.
The infinite regress problem, however, is best understood as a
contextual caution rather than a foundational difficulty.38 In some settings,
especially when making a string of similar decisions, decisionmakers
can confidently expect that the next bit of information to turn up will be
of limited value, even if they do not know what that information will be.
Searching a very large database of employment opportunities, I might
rationally calculate that the costs of further search exceed the benefits.
Even if I cannot know what the next opportunity I turn up will be—perhaps
it is something far superior to any of the ones I have seen so far—I can
rationally assess the chances of its being superior, because I have
observed a long series of similar entries, know something about how the
database was compiled, and thus have no good reason to expect anything
different in the future. Experience supplies prior probabilities from
37. Jon Elster, Introduction, in RATIONAL CHOICE 1, 25 (1986).
38. For a different line of response to the infinite-regress argument, see Holly
Smith, Deciding How to Decide: Is There a Regress Problem?, in FOUNDATIONS OF
DECISION THEORY: ISSUES AND ADVANCES 194 (Michael Bacharach & Susan Hurley eds.,
1991).
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which decisionmakers can generate rational expectations about the
benefits of future information.
In the interpretive setting, judges or other interpreters can draw upon
prior experience to form rational assessments of the value of the next bit
of information about, say, legislative intentions, even if they do not
know the content of that information. Much will depend upon the
conditions under which optimizing is deployed. Some interpretive
decisions are of a sort that are repeated frequently, some are not. Where
experience suggests that new options or new information can be
expected to differ somewhat, but not radically, from previous options or
information, then the expected value of further search is predictably a
medium-sized quantity that can be meaningfully compared to the costs
of further search. In such cases it seems clear that optimizing
interpretation is possible.
So the argument from infinite regress cannot knock optimizing out of
the ring. Is there a general argument against satisficing? The most
common criticism is that satisficing is arbitrary, because the bare idea of
satisficing says nothing about where exactly the satisficer’s aspiration
level should be set. Why should interpreters be satisfied with this much
rather than that much evidence of legislative intentions, or ordinary
meaning? Again, however, the force of this point varies across settings.
Aspiration levels need not be exogenously fixed once and for all.
Instead they can be endogenously formed, as decisionmakers acquire
experience with the relevant settings. In many domains, experience will
suggest that the band, within which an aspiration level might plausibly
be set will be quite narrow. In the cafeteria example, no one would
continue the search until a gourmet meal turns up, simply because it is
quite predictable that no such meal will ever turn up; the context will not
support any such aspiration. Although such practical considerations are not
conceptually satisfying, it is not clear that satisficing rules themselves
have or need have any aspiration to be conceptually satisfying. So long
as they fulfill their primary mission of truncating local search at a point
that is globally maximizing, they are good enough.
These mutual criticisms by optimizers and satisficers point to a
commonsensical conclusion. Neither optimizing nor satisficing is
universally or acontextually best; the choice between stopping rules will
and should vary as the features of the interpretive setting vary. A large
challenge, one I cannot take on here, would be to delineate the
conditions under which one stopping rule or the other is superior. As a
preliminary matter, however, a useful idea is to focus on the size of the
stakes at hand in the decision. On one hand, with very low-stakes
decisions, satisficing appears most attractive, relative to optimizing.
“The less we care about the gap between satisfactory and optimal
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toothpaste, for example, the more reason we have to satisfice—to look
for a satisfactory brand and stop searching when we find it.”39 On the
other hand, where the stakes are very high, especially where decisions
involve a choice between seemingly incommensurable values or life
plans, satisficing also appears useful, perhaps inevitable. In the decision
whether to become a doctor or a soldier, it is quite unclear what it would
mean to collect an optimal amount of information before making a
decision, and the best we can hope for is to make a satisfactory
choice.40 On this view, optimizing makes most sense for decisions
with medium-sized stakes.41 In those settings, the expected benefit of
collecting more information or generating new options is appreciable but
also limited, and thus meaningfully comparable to the costs of further
search.
Many interpretive decisions are plausibly medium-stakes problems, in
which any of the possible interpretations will be consequential for the
legal system, but none will be of overwhelming importance. An even
larger fraction of interpretive decisions, however, are the law’s equivalent of
picking toothpaste in a store,42 at least from the interpreter’s point of
view. These are cases important to the parties at hand, but with few
broader consequences for other cases, actors, or problems. Such cases
probably dominate the interpretive work of administrative agencies and
lower courts; some might claim that they are not uncommon on the
Supreme Court’s docket. To move beyond the conceptual mapping of
interpretive strategies I offer here, we would need to think about which
interpretive strategies might be best at different levels of the legal
system, when used by different interpreters with distinct roles and
institutional capacities. We might find, for example, that satisficing is
best for interpreters in the low-stakes settings that predominate in the
ordinary work of law, while interpreters working in more consequential
settings might do better to optimize. Here I merely indicate the
importance of these institutional questions, without offering answers to
them.

39.
40.
41.

Schmidtz, supra note 3, at 36.
See Elster, supra note 37, at 19–20.
See Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Opting: The Case of Big Decisions, in YEARBOOK
OF THE WISSENSCHAFTSKOLLEG ZU BERLIN 441–54 (1984).
42. For a more in-depth discussion of the relative importance of individual cases,
see Edna Ullmann-Margalit & Sidney Morgenbesser, Picking and Choosing, 44 SOC.
RES. 757 (1977).
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V. THE PREVALENCE OF MAXIMIZING: SOME MECHANISMS
I have criticized maximizing interpretation and offered qualified
praise, varying across contexts, for the optimizing and satisficing alternatives.
However, if maximizing interpretation is so simpleminded, why does it
have so many defenders—both on the bench and in the academy? Here I
will survey some mechanisms that tend to push interpreters past the
point at which optimizers or satisficers will abandon the hope of local
perfection and cut off the search for further evidence.
Self-interested motivation. For Bentham, the mechanism was obvious:
self-interested collusive behavior on the part of judges, lawyers, and
other legal actors. Maximizing interpretation is, above all, complex
interpretation. The simplemindedly maximizing local interpreter is far more
likely to take into account a rich and complex array of considerations,
sources, and evidence bearing on the interpretive problem at hand. For
Bentham, complexity was the fruit of conspiracy. Judge & Co. benefit
jointly and severally from a highly complex, even mysterious legal
system in which laypeople must pay rents to lawyers to steer through the
thickets that the lawyers themselves have created.43 Although the claim
rests on far too simpleminded an account of the motivations of lawyers
and judges, it had better institutional foundations when Bentham wrote.
Consider that judges were commonly paid from the fees of litigants, and
that one of Bentham’s principal reforms was to urge that judges be put
on regular government salaries.
Cost externalization. Peter Schuck puts Bentham’s argument in more
modern terms, and less conspiratorial ones, by observing that the costs
and benefits of complex legal interpretation are unequally distributed
over different actors and groups.44 If maximizing interpretation is complex
interpretation, as I have claimed, then Schuck’s argument also suggests
that maximizing interpreters may push the search for evidence beyond
the bounds that would limit an optimizing or satisficing interpreter, just
because maximizing interpreters do not themselves internalize all the
costs—including the opportunity costs and decision costs—of maximizing
interpretation. Consider a possible claim that maximizing intentionalism,
with its exhaustive search through legislative history and other sources,
is feasible for judges only because many of the resulting decision costs
are externalized onto litigants and other legal actors.
Neglect of opportunity costs. Bentham’s account, as updated by
Schuck, points to self-interested motivations on the part of lawyers,
43. H.L.A. Hart, The Demystification of the Law, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES
IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 21 (1982).
44. PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

15–22 (2000).
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judges, and other legal actors. But there is a cognitive mechanism operating
as well, one that plausibly affects even public-spirited actors. I refer to
the neglect of opportunity costs, relative to more visible direct costs.
Neglect of opportunity costs tends to make decisionmaking excessively
intensive and complex, in the maximizing style, rather than brisk and
mechanical, in the optimizing and satisficing styles. Decisionmakers
focus to excess on the costs of getting this decision wrong, while
overlooking the costs that a protracted process of decisionmaking itself
creates. “The neglect of the opportunity costs that are created by the fact
that decision making takes time is . . . an important and pervasive source
of irrationality.”45
An ethical analogy, and the distorting force of particulars. An
analogy to ethics is useful here. The choice between maximizing, on the
one hand, and optimizing or satisficing on the other, has some of the
same intellectual structure as the choice between rule-consequentialism
and act-consequentialism. Rule-consequentialism counsels that ethical
agents follow that set of rules whose observance will produce the best
consequences over an array of decisions. Act-consequentialism, on the
other hand, counsels ethical agents directly to choose whichever action
produces the best consequences.46 The rule-consequentialist acknowledges
that the relevant rules may sometimes call for actions that, when viewed
in isolation, are locally suboptimal from the consequentialist point of
view. The rule-consequentialist, then, will sometimes be placed in
the awkward position of defending acts whose immediate effect is,
when viewed in isolation, socially detrimental. So too, it is the
easiest thing in the world for maximizing interpreters to emphasize
specific cases in which stopping rules produce interpretive blunders,
relative to an all-things-considered approach that would (if applied by
an infallible interpreter with infinite time to make decisions) have taken
into account relevant information excluded by a stopping rule.
A corollary is that second-order interpretive strategies suffer from the
distorting force of particulars. Maximizers will always be able to point
to lurid examples in which second-order strategies produce suboptimal
results, even if second-order strategies are best from some overall
45. JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS 291
n.149 (1999).
46. For a current metaethical treatment of this distinction, see generally BRAD
HOOKER, IDEAL CODE, REAL WORLD: A RULE-CONSEQUENTALIST THEORY OF MORALITY
(2000).
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perspective. Such examples pack a strong rhetorical punch, but the problem
goes deeper than that. The vivid costs in particular cases may trigger
cognitive failings in the audience that is to evaluate the competing
decisionmaking strategies, causing them to overreact to specifics while
ignoring the crucial question of overall justification. A crucial
mechanism here is salience, a heuristic that causes decisionmakers to
overweight the importance of vivid, concrete foreground information
and to underweight the importance of abstract, aggregated background
information.47
VI. CONCLUSION
I conclude with some mixed notes of pessimism and optimism. If
simpleminded local maximizing is intellectually untenable, it is also
remarkably persistent in the theory and practice of legal interpretation,
by virtue of the mechanisms discussed in Part IV. We can at least hope,
however, to make interpreters and students of interpretation aware that
the maximizing style is not inevitable, that it represents a particular
choice among local decisionmaking strategies, and that local maximizing is
by no means obviously desirable from the globally-maximizing
perspective. This point is only preliminary, for it does nothing to
indicate what interpretive strategies are actually best in various settings.
The subsequent questions are empirical, and involve the institutional
capacities of interpreters. But in a legal system that still respects the
claims of maximizing interpretation, it is a good place to start.

47. See SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
125–26, 178–80 (1993) (discussing the salience heuristic and the closely related
heuristics of vividness and availability). Cf. Robert M. Reyes et al., Judgmental Biases
Resulting From Differing Availabilities of Arguments, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 2, 5–12 (1980) (demonstrating that vivid, concrete information exerts greater
influence on mock jury deliberations than abstract, pallid information). For the impact
of cognitive illusions and affective forces on judges, see Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001).
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